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I. NOT A PRETTY PICTURE
The occasion was a faculty lunch with presentations from three
members of the local bar. One was a partner at one of the largest and
most respected firms in the city. Another was a former student of
great ability and charm who had left one of the other large elite firms
to form his own small, successful firm. The third, if I recall correctly,
practiced with one of the federal agencies. Our purpose was to
reinforce contacts with the city's practitioners and learn more
concerning their views of contemporary law practice. I remember the
two private practitioners more clearly because I had familiarity with
and admiration for both the large firm and the young lawyer, and
because I was taken quite by surprise by one aspect of the message
they brought us: each made it clear that law practice had changed,
and that there was no longer time for mentoring. The need for both
associates and partners to accumulate billable hours and to spend
time attracting clients simply left no significant opportunity for the
mentoring relationship. That this was true was not so much the
surprise. What I found distressing and memorable was the matter-offact presentation, the absence of any indication that these lawyers felt
either alarm or shame that this was their situation.
Professor Schiltz has done a great service in posting a warning
about the current reality of practice in large elite law firms. The picture he reveals is not a pretty one. The law firm work environment
which our most able law students enter will diminish them in
significant ways. Few will successfully resist the pressures they will
*
Professor, University of Denver College of Law; A.B. Stanford University, J.D. Yale
Law School.
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encounter. And there seems to be very little that legal educators or
young lawyers can do about it. It is hard to fight the market, hard to
resist a dominant culture. One thinks of swimming in the ocean or
floating a river; for the most part you go where the water takes you,
controlling your direction only within quite modest confines. Those of
us who teach the legal profession course (also known as "professional
responsibility" or "ethics") are well aware that although we can
provide some perspectives and models, transmit some knowledge,
open some questions and plant some seeds, the major determinants of
professional behavior will result from role modeling and practice
pressures during the neophyte lawyer's apprenticeship experience.
Our influence as teachers of ethics will be small compared to that of
the lawyers from whom our students learn to practice law.
Each year when I teach the legal profession course one or two
hours are devoted to trying to educate the students concerning the
situation described by Professor Schiltz. With the students I try to
generate alternatives and search for creative possibilities. I have had
hopes that in time the market would self-correct to some modest extent, that the unattractiveness of what the big firms had to offer
would become manifest, and therefore change. Perhaps the most discouraging message in Schiltz's letter was that law students don't
welcome such a market option even when it appears:
The hiring partner of any major firm will tell you that if his firm offers first
year associates a salary of $69,000, and a competitor down the street offers
them $72,000, those who have the choice will flock to the competitor-even if
the competitor will require them to bill 200 hours more each year.'

The letter will become one of the assignments for this segment of the
course. It will help paint the picture and generate some motivation,
but I doubt that it will help much with the options or with optimism
that there are a lot of alternatives available. A few creative,
courageous, or lucky students among those sought by the elite firms
will find alternatives, but most will not.
There is some hope in remembering that relatively few law
students become employees of elite firms. At most law schools, most
graduates will not have this temptation. Because a position at an
elite firm is not available to them, they will have little choice but to
try to be creative in seeking options. The most salutary effect of
Professor Schiltz's letter for this group may well be to diminish their
1.
Patrick J. Schiltz, On Being a Happy, Healthy, and Ethical Member of an Unhappy,
Unhealthy, and Unethical Profession,52 VAND. L. REV. 871, 898 (1999).
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envy for those who practice law at such firms. It could help them to
believe that they are genuinely fortunate to be forced to find or
construct other options.
II. THE ABBA
Professor Schiltz is a neo-Aristotelian. He sees ethics more as
a matter of perception, habit, and virtues than of rules or principles.2
In the past I have found this view of ethics helpful in approaching
problems which resist solution by the rules of lawyers' ethics or by the
general theory which underlies the rules. 3 It also seems more descriptively accurate concerning the way we perceive the moral issues
in our lives and how we reach decisions regarding them. I think it
helps as well in looking for ways to ameliorate the situation described
by Professor Schiltz. Under this view a community and a functioning
"practice" are necessary to provide the context for ethics based on
perception, habit, and virtues. 4 This kind of ethics cannot function
without role models, and thus my sharp disappointment at that
faculty lunch when the mentoring culture was so blithely dismissed. I
had thought that those two lawyers, at least, would assume that time
for meaningful mentoring relationships was essential for the development of young lawyers. I was wrong, and should not have been so
surprised. For some time it has been clear that the practice of law, at
least at most elite American law firms most of the time, does not appear to be a "practice" in the neo-Aristotelian sense. 5 In his letter, as
well as in his previous article,6 Schiltz demonstrates that focus on the
external goods of money and status have left the internal goods of the
practice of law in the shadows. They are valued now-if at all-only
as they contribute to the external goods. 7

2.

This is suggested from his prior article even more clearly than in the current letter.

See generally Patrick J. Schiltz, Legal Ethics in Decline: The Elite Law Firm, the Elite Law
School, and the MoralFormationof the Novice Attorney, 82 MINN. L. REV. 705 (1998).
3.
See Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law: An Exercise in the
Jurisprudenceand Ethics ofLawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545, 1607-09 (1995).
4.
My understanding of the neo-Aristotelian approach is drawn primarily from ALASDAIR
MACINTYRE, ATER VmRU: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY (2nd ed. 1984) and JEFFREY STOUT,
ETICS AFTER BABEL: THE LANGUAGES OF MORALS AND THEIR DIScoNTENTS (1988). A brief in-

troduction to this view in relation to the practice of the professions, and a brief explication of the
neo-Aristotelian meaning of "practice," can be found in the final chapter of Stout's book.
5.
See Pepper, supranote 3, at 1609.
6.
See Schiltz, supra note 2, at 72046.

7.
The last chapter of EthicsAfter Babel provides a discussion of the interplay of internal
and external goods, using the practice of medicine as one of the recurring examples. See STOUT,
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How might we assist our students in resisting the market and
the dominant culture in the legal profession, both focused almost exclusively on external goods? The warning and awakening we might
accomplish in law school will at best alert them to where the waves or
current are likely to carry them. One possibility I have occasionally
considered is to encourage our former students to form an
organization to support resistance to the tide, to remind them that
there are values other than money which might guide their lives. A
few senior lawyers-those inclined to be mentors, or who remember
their own mentors, or who hate the tyranny of billable hours--could
be sought out to join as well. Such an organization might not do
much. But hope and reminder, which it could occasionally furnish,
are better than nothing. Such an association might also support a
richer view of professional ethics than that provided by the Model
Rules, on one hand, and the avoidance of malpractice or other legal
liability on the other. There are a number of law professors who, if
approached, would likely support an effort of this kind. Robert
Gordon, 8 Anthony Kronman, 9 and Patrick Schiltz come easily to mind.
There are likely to be many others who would be willing to support
such an organization. We could call it the ABBA. 1° A monthly meeting with an at least somewhat like-minded group could help lawyers

supra note 4, at 266-92. This section includes a short list of the "virtues7 involved in good
medical practice. This list is suggestive of similar virtues, which might be relevant to the
ethical practice of law. See id. at 269.
See generally Robert W. Gordon, CorporateLaw Practiceas a Public Calling,49 MD. L.
8.
REV. 255 (1990); Robert W. Gordon, The Independence ofLawyers, 68 B.U. L. REV. 1 (1988).
See generally ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE
9.
LEGAL PROFESSION (1993).
10. The "After Babel Bar Association," referring to Jeffrey Stout's AFTER BABEL, supra
note 4. Stout attempts to accommodate both liberal, individualist understandings and the neo-

Aristotelian approach to social institutions, practices, and ethics. For example, at one point he
summarizes:
A stereoscopic social critic would be inclined to concentrate on factors like these: the
tendency of the capitalist marketplace and large-scale bureaucracies to provide material
conditions that permit social practices to flourish, while at the same time they

undermine the moral conditions needed to achieve goods internal to such practices; the
tendency of professionalization and bureaucratic enforcement of rights, in some
instances, to mitigate the bad effects of the marketplace on specific social practices and
the people participating in them; the tendency of particular social practices, especially
within the professions, to become all-consuming, thus making it increasingly difficult to

be both a full-fledged participant in the practice and a good anything else ....
Id. at 289. My approach to professional ethics, particularly lawyers' ethics, involves a similar
attempt to include both understandings. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Autonomy, Community
and Lawyers' Ethics, 19 CAP. U. L. REV. 939 (1990); Stephen L. Pepper, Lawyers' Ethics in the
Gap Between Law and Justice, 40 S. TEx. L. REv. 181 (1999) [hereinafter Pepper, Law and

Justice].
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remember that they are not crazy, that the craziness is in the work
world in which they are engulfed.
III. ETHICS, ROLE AND MODESTY
Professor Schiltz advises young lawyers that the ethics of their
professional lives with which they should be concerned fall into three
major categories. First are the disciplinary rules, which are only
"'the lowest common denominator of conduct that a highly self-interested group will tolerate.'" Second are ordinary moral intuitions.
These have little to do specifically with being a lawyer; they have to
do with being a decent, ethical person in general, including during
one's many hours at work. Third, aside from being a lawyer, is living
an ethical life by meeting one's responsibilities to family, friends,
community, and God." This delineation of professional ethics is too
narrow and has the potential to mislead lawyers in ways which are
significant. Although it leads in a different direction from Schiltz's
primary and important message, I want to spend a few minutes expanding the notion of ethics to which young lawyers should attend.
The only ethics distinctive to lawyering which Schiltz takes
account of are the disciplinary rules, and that approach leaves out
something essential: the underlying nature of professional ethics.
Professionals are servants. 12 Their function is to help the client or
patient with something which (1) is of special importance, and (2) the
client or patient cannot do for himself. The patient needs access to
health care; the client needs to use or learn about the law. The professional has a monopoly on the needed knowledge and assistance,
and the client is vulnerable because he has no basis from which to
judge or evaluate the assistance he is receiving from the professional.
Professional ethics derive from this imbalance: the vulnerability of
the patient or client, the stronger relative position of the professional,
and the fact that the professional is making a living in the context of
this imbalance. Professional ethics are thus role specific. Ordinary
market-based ethics are thought insufficient due to the special need

11. Schiltz, supranote 1, at 908-10.
12. See generally Rob Atkinson, How the Butler Was Made to Do It: The Perverted
Professionalismof The Remains of the Day, 105 YALE L.J. 177 (1995), for an extended discussion
ofthe implications and difficulties of viewing the professional role from this angle.
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and vulnerability of clients. 13 The imbalance creates the need for a
special restraint and obligation absent from other relationships.
It is important for lawyers to have thought through and understood the role specific obligations of being a professional. The obligation of putting the client's interest first-the underlying professional
ethic-works best when internalized and assumed, when it becomes a
habit. But it is easy to forget, and easy to never learn. It is this aspect of a lawyer's ethical obligation which Professor Schiltz has to a
large extent left out. Consider an example provided in his earlier article:
James Fitzmaurice, who was my partner and mentor, once sued an insurance
company on behalf of another law firm. The insurance company had refused to
pay our client for several years of work that the firm had done for one of the
company's insureds. The company had also refused to pay several other law
firms, and all of them had brought their own claims. Millions of dollars were

at stake. 14

The lawyer for the defendant insurance company was extraordinarily obnoxious, "about as difficult and obstreperous and just plain
nasty as a lawyer could be." Apparently he was not well liked by
someone at his own law firm as well, or at the client insurance company, because Fitzmaurice received an unmarked envelope in the
mail containing "a copy of a lengthy memorandum" analyzing the
strengths and weaknesses of the case and strategy for handling it-a
document obviously intended to be confidential and of potential importance to the outcome of the action. 15 Several of the lawyers for
other plaintiffs also received the document. There was no legal obligation to return the document or not to use it. The other lawyers
used it and did not tell the opponent they had received it. Only
Fitzmaurice returned it with a letter explaining how he had received
it, and did not read or use it.16
Professor Schiltz admires this choice by Fitzmaurice, thinking
it reflected "the highest professional ethics." 7
I believe both
Fitzmaurice and Schiltz overlooked their client. The lawsuit was not
the lawyers', it was the client's. The lawyers were there in a
13. Or so the argument goes. There is of course substantial skepticism concerning this
model from many angles. See, e.g., Stephen L. Pepper, Applying the Fundamentalsof Lawyers'
Ethics to Insurance Defense Practice,4 CoNN. INS. L.J. 27, 41-46 (1997-98) (sketching the model
and some of the critique).
14. Schiltz, supra note 2, at 715.
15. Id. at 715-16.
16. See id. at 716.
17. Id.
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representative capacity, as servants of the client. The document was
sent to the lawyers because they were representing their client in that
particular matter, and for no other reason. It was lawful to read and
make use of the document.'8 Their client believed it had been cheated
of compensation for several years of work. The defendant who had
cheated them had hired an obnoxious, uncooperative lawyer, thus
adding further expense and unpleasantness to resolving the matter.
Someone associated with that lawyer or with the defendant felt
strongly enough about the situation to have sent the document.
Using the document or not might have been the determinative factor
in the outcome of a suit which involved a very large amount of money
apparently justly owed to the client. The client was sophisticated and
could easily have understood the choice to be made.
I believe that choice ought to have been the client's, not
Fitzmaurice's. In being reflexively "ethical," Fitzmaurice overlooked
the client, and was insufficiently modest. The client might have
thought that given the unjust way it had been treated by the defendant, the obnoxious and unproductive conduct of the attorney, and the
amount at stake, it was morally justifiable to make use of the memorandum. (Our mothers and fathers taught us that "two wrongs don't
make a right," but the client might have concluded otherwise in this
situation.) Fitzmaurice was free to disagree, and to try to persuade
the client that he was right and they were wrong. 9 He was free to
withdraw from the representation if he failed to persuade them and
was unwilling to serve them through use of the memorandum. But he
ought not to have presumed to take the choice from them.
The rules of the profession agree. This was not a technical
matter which the client could not understand. There was no time
pressure. Model Rule 1.4(b) states that "[a] lawyer shall explain a
matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to
make informed decisions regarding the representation."20 The client
was not allowed to make an informed decision about this aspect of
this matter. Rule 1.2(a) states in part that "[a] lawyer shall abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation.., and
shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be
pursued."2' No consultation about means in regard to the memorandum occurred. The Comment to Rule 1.2(a) states in part: "In ques-

18.
19.

See id. at 716 n.27.
See Pepper, Law andJustice, supranote 10, at 190.

20.

MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1983).

21.

Id. Rule 1.2(a).
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tions of means, the lawyer should assume responsibility for technical
and legal tactical issues, but should defer to the client regarding such
questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons
who might be adversely affected." 22 Use of the memorandum seems to
me more analogous to concern for third persons and expense than to
technical and tactical questions, but others might disagree. Ethical
Consideration 7-8 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
states in part: "In the final analysis, however, the lawyer should always remember that the decision whether to forego legally available
objectives or methods because of non-legal factors is ultimately for the
client and not for himself."23
Rules are likely to be secondary at best, however, in this kind
of situation. Whether or not a lawyer perceives the issue as one of
client choice is more likely to be determined by her understanding of
what the appropriate general ethical role for the lawyer is. It is how
the lawyer sees the situation which will be determinative.
Fitzmaurice could have reflexively seen the situation as one calling
for a discussion with the client concerning what was the right thing to
do. That would have "accorded more with the underlying ethic of the
professions. It also would have allowed lawyer and client to have a
moral influence upon one another. The more ethical choice becomes a
respectable topic of discussion for lawyer and client-the more ethical
choice becomes a matter of common deliberation among those in24
volved-the better off we will be as a culture.

IV. CONCLUSION

Twenty years ago when I left a large, elite firm to go into
teaching, several of the senior partners expressed envy for my choice
and for the life I was heading toward. This was a quite distinct surprise to me, for these partners had appeared paragons of success,
happy with who they were and what they did, and (one might have
said) quite self-satisfied. Only in the privacy of their offices did they
reveal regret at the choices they had made. And this was before the
devolution in the satisfactions of elite law practice that has characterized the past two decades. It strikes me as an uncomfortable role for
those of us who left law practice, and who now make our living preparing others for that which we have left, to be sending our students
22.

Id. Rule 1.2(a) cmt.

23.

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-8 (1981).

24.

See Pepper, Law and Justice,supra note 10, at 203.
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out into a law firm market and culture we perceive as so likely to be
harmful to them. Perhaps it is unseemly for us to articulate this view
of the profession. Those who teach the legal profession course face
this problem constantly. As teachers and scholars our job is to try to
find and teach that which we believe to be true. Yet in this course, so
much of what we believe to be true may be disillusioning and
discouraging to those about to enter work in the profession. Professor
Schiltz's letter is a valuable contribution to our role as scholars and
teachers. One can hope that it will function as a beginning and not an
end, and that at least a few, both in the law schools and in the firms,
will try to find ways to ameliorate the situation he describes.

